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Employment fl uctuations in a dual labour market
The authors of this article are James Costain, Juan F. Jimeno and Carlos Thomas, of the Directorate General 
Economics, Statistics and Research.1
During the last two decades, the Spanish labour market has shown high employment and 
unemployment volatility. In growth phases, job creation and the decrease in the unemployment 
rate have been very high but during downturns in the cycle, job destruction and the increase 
in unemployment have also been substantial. This phenomenon has become yet more evident 
during the recent economic crisis when the unemployment rate, in the face of a slowdown in 
growth similar to that experienced by other countries, increased by around 10 pp, a far higher 
fi gure than that recorded even in countries which have labour markets with low fi ring costs (for 
example, Ireland and the United States).
In principle, there may be several explanations for this high employment volatility. In the face of 
a negative shock, a sectoral breakdown biased towards labour-intensive activities may trigger 
more pronounced job destruction. Furthermore, the greater wage inertia is, with labour costs 
not adapting to this shock, the greater job destruction will be. Finally, the level and duality of 
fi ring costs directly impact hiring and fi ring decisions and, consequently, they also determine 
net job destruction in the face of a negative shock.
This article summarises the main fi ndings of a recent eminently analytical paper [see Costain, Ji-
meno and Thomas (2010)], the main objective of which is to identify to what extent the third of 
these above-mentioned factors, duality, generated by the coexistence of very different temporary 
and permanent employment contracts, contributes to increasing employment and unemployment 
volatility. In order to achieve this aim, it is necessary to analyse fi rms’ decisions to make temporary 
employees permanent ones and to hire and fi re both types of employees, so as to calculate the 
effects of different economic shocks on job creation and destruction fl ows and to compare them 
with the fl ows that would be recorded in a labour market with a single contract type.
The main fi ndings of this analysis suggest, fi rstly, that contract duality exacerbates fl uctuations in 
employment and unemployment. If the social costs of unemployment tend to grow more quickly 
the higher the level of unemployment is, this greater volatility has obvious costs in terms of social 
welfare. Similarly, contract duality tends to reduce productivity, even without taking into account 
the negative effects associated with a lower accumulation of experience and smaller investment 
in training by employees and employers which creates even more temporary employment. These 
effects cannot be recorded by the analytical model used. Lastly, for the lower volatility that would 
result from moving away from duality to also translate into a reduction in the average unemploy-
ment rate, it would have to be coupled with a reduction in average fi ring costs.
In any event, it is important to take into account that the analytical model, the results of which 
are summarised in this article, is not per se designed to act as a basis for a comprehensive 
proposal for labour reform. In order to draw up a proposal of this type it would be necessary 
to analyse, for example, other important factors within the regulatory framework of employ-
ment contracts and additional aspects on how the labour market operates, such as wage 
bargaining mechanisms and the management of active policies to boost employment which 
Introduction
1. This article summarises some of the fi ndings of Costain, Jimeno and Thomas (2010), which study the relationship 
between employment volatility and the system of employment contracts. 
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may infl uence the reduction in the unemployment rate over the cycle and its volatility. All of 
these matters are clearly beyond the scope of this article.
Two important characteristics of Spanish labour market dynamics are the prevalence of em-
ployees with a temporary contract in employment fl uctuations and high worker turnover. As 
can be seen in Chart 1, from 2001 to 2008, and on average for every 100 participants in the 
labour market, 10.1 were unemployed, 29 had a temporary job and the remaining 60.9 had a 
permanent job. Unemployment infl ows and outfl ows were mainly routed through temporary 
employment. Thus, in each quarter 7.9% of those employed with a temporary contract be-
came unemployed in comparison with 0.9% of those employed with a permanent contract. 
Also, each quarter 22.9% of the unemployed moved into a temporary job, with only 3.2% 
moving into permanent employment. The quarterly rate of conversion of temporary employees 
into permanent ones averaged only 0.8% for this period.
A labour market model with three basic features is used to analyse the implications of duality 
for employment volatility. These features are: i) the fact that when the unemployed search for 
jobs and companies search for employees, there is a cost in terms of time and resources; ii) 
employers create jobs as they expect to earn a positive return from them, and iii) job destruc-
tion occurs when the return on the jobs turns negative as a result of adverse shocks. This type 
of conceptual framework has become the usual method for analysing the macroeconomic 
consequences of labour institutions.2 In order to include duality, it is assumed that fi rms can 
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2. See Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) for the seminal work underpinning this type of model. Although existing literature 
has analysed labour institutions in relation to average unemployment levels, currently attention is being focused increas-
ingly on the determinants of unemployment volatility. A recent paper by Sala and Silva (2009) analyses the impact of fi ring 
costs on cyclical unemployment volatility, concluding that the key issue is the average value of fi ring costs, not whether 
the latter differ on the basis of employment contract type. 
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only use two types of contract: permanent ones with high fi ring costs and temporary ones 
without fi ring costs but with the legal restriction that they have a pre-set term and, when they 
end, employment can only be continued through a permanent contract.
In view of these contractual arrangements, apart from deciding how many vacancies fi rms 
create, they must establish rules for deciding: i) when and with what type of contract they 
employ workers to fi ll the vacancies created; ii) whether or not they convert the temporary 
contract into a permanent one when it ends, and iii) when to fi re workers, irrespective of con-
tract type. Under very general conditions, it can be demonstrated that in this simplifi ed frame-
work the rules followed by fi rms to adjust the level and structure of their labour force are as 
follows. In order for employers to offer a job to the unemployed they contact, the productivity 
of the job to be created must exceed a certain threshold (the hiring threshold). Furthermore, all 
the newly-created jobs are fi lled with employees on temporary contracts.3 Temporary employ-
ees whose contract has expired become permanent employees only if the productivity of the 
corresponding job at a given moment in time is higher than the conversion threshold; the 
higher the fi ring costs are, the higher the conversion threshold is. Temporary employees are 
fi red either when their productivity decreases below the level corresponding to hiring or when 
their contracts expire and their productivity level at that time is lower than that required for 
conversion. Similarly, permanent employees are fi red when their productivity decreases below 
another particular threshold (the separation threshold); the lower the fi ring cost, the lower the 
separation threshold. This productivity threshold, governing the separation of permanent em-
ployees, is lower than the hiring threshold that determines the hiring of temporary employees 
and which, in turn, is lower than the threshold for converting temporary jobs into permanent 
ones. During upturns, the three productivity thresholds are lower than in downturns and, con-
sequently, more employees are hired and fewer are fi red during expansionary phases.
This behaviour has several important consequences for the functioning of the labour market. 
Due to the difference in fi ring costs, jobs occupied by permanent employees with lower pro-
ductivity than that in newly created jobs are kept open, which has a negative impact on the 
economy’s aggregate productivity. Likewise, if at the time the temporary contract expires pro-
ductivity is high but not suffi ciently so to justify conversion, ineffi cient fi ring occurs. As a result, 
the hiring and non-renewal of temporary employees gives rise to a very high labour turnover 
and, during upturns, fragile jobs build up, namely those jobs which, because they have rela-
tively low productivity, would be destroyed immediately as soon as a cyclical downturn came 
about. Employees with temporary contracts are affected more by “fragility” than those with 
permanent contracts. This effect is suffi cient for cyclical employment and unemployment vola-
tility to be higher in a dual labour market than in a market with a single contract type, even if 
the latter has low fi ring costs.
In order to estimate the contribution of duality to employment and unemployment volatility, sev-
eral simulations were performed based on a version of the model described in the previous sec-
tion. The parameters of the model were chosen so as to reproduce the basic characteristics of 
the Spanish labour market. Thus, in the baseline scenario, the average unemployment rate is 
around 10%; temporary employees account for one-third of total numbers employed; labour 
fl ows between unemployment, temporary employment and permanent employment are of a 
similar magnitude to the fl ows in the Spanish labour market (see Chart 1), and the volatility of the 
unemployment rate is also similar to that seen in the case of Spain in the 1987-2008 period.
Duality and employment 
volatility
3. Intuitively, if the only difference between the two types of contracts is the fi ring costs, employers always prefer to offer a 
temporary contract. As a result, in the model there are no direct fl ows from unemployment to permanent employment. This 
is shown in Chart 1 where the fl ow from “Unemployment” to “Permanent employment” is represented by a coloured line.
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The two panels in Chart 2 illustrate the cyclical changes in employment and in the correspond-
ing fl ows of job creation and destruction which occur in a dual labour market. At the beginning 
of each recession both temporary and permanent employment decrease sharply with the 
elimination of fragile jobs.
The fall in temporary employment is particularly steep, despite representing only about half of 
permanent employment prior to the recession. At the beginning of expansionary phases, tempo-
rary employment begins to grow more strongly since all the new jobs are fi lled with employees on 
temporary contracts and only after some time has elapsed does the number of temporary jobs 
converted to permanent jobs begin to build up. Consequently, there are three reasons which 
explain high temporary employment volatility. First, new hires are always temporary before at-
taining permanent status. For this reason, at the beginning of an expansionary phase, tempo-
rary employment always rises above its long-term level. Similarly, some temporary jobs are 
fragile from the moment they are created because fi rms will offer work even to low-productiv-
ity workers with the knowledge that they will probably last for a short time as employees. 
Conversely, newly-created permanent jobs have relatively high productivity and only become 
fragile in the event of a suffi ciently adverse productivity shock. Consequently, fragile jobs build 
up more slowly among permanent contracts than among temporary ones (as the comparison 
of the blue and red lines in Chart 3 shows). Consequently, the wave of lay-offs at the beginning 
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of a recession centres on temporary employees following a short or average-length expan-
sionary phase and only affects many permanent jobs after a particularly long growth period. 
Finally, fragile temporary contracts are terminated for two reasons: because a suffi ciently neg-
ative shock occurs or because the temporary contract expires. Fragile permanent contracts 
have a much longer expected duration because they are only terminated if there is an adverse 
shock. And since such contracts have a much longer expected duration than temporary em-
ployment, cyclical productivity variations have a smaller effect on the fi ring threshold for em-
ployees with a permanent contract than on the corresponding threshold for temporary em-
ployees, with the result that during recessions the fi ring of permanent employees increases 
less than that of temporary employees.
Apart from illustrating the reasons for higher cyclical temporary employment volatility, this con-
ceptual framework makes it possible to perform simulations to compare employment volatility 
in various fi ring cost regimes. Specifi cally, it is possible to analyse whether duality alone, con-
sidered independently of the level of fi ring costs, triggers higher employment volatility. Table 1 
compares the results in the dual labour market (column 1) with different cases of labour mar-
kets with a single contract type. Firstly, in column 2 it is assumed that the labour market has 
no temporary contracts and the high fi ring costs of employees with a permanent contract in 
the baseline scenario are applied to all employees. Secondly, in column 3 it is assumed that 
there is a single contract with fi ring costs that are the same as the average for the dual labour 
market in the baseline scenario. Thirdly, in column 4 it is assumed that the labour market has 
a single contract type and that fi ring costs are such that the total fi ring costs paid as a percent-
age of GDP are the same as in the baseline scenario. Lastly, in column fi ve it is assumed that 
the average unemployment rate is the same as in the dual labour market in the baseline sce-
nario. The results show that the dual labour market causes volatility in the unemployment rate 
that is around 20% higher than that in all the scenarios considered in labour markets with a 
single contract type. The results also allow us to conclude that in order to reduce employment 
volatility and cut the average unemployment rate at the same time, it is necessary that the 
process of unifying contracts involves a mean decrease in fi ring costs.
The main reason why employment fl uctuates less in a labour market with a single contract type 
is that, in this case, job creation and destruction is determined through two productivity thresh-
NUMBER OF FRAGILE JOBS  CHART 3 
SOURCE: Costain, Jimeno and Thomas (2010). 
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olds: one that refers to the hiring of new employees and another that refers to fi ring them, at a 
lower productivity level than the hiring threshold. This means that the above-mentioned effects 
relating to cyclical temporary employment volatility in a dual labour market disappear. Specifi -
cally, while in the dual labour market some workers are employed directly in fragile jobs, in a 
scenario with a single contract type, jobs only become fragile if their productivity declines after 
they are fi lled and, consequently, their numbers build up more slowly. Furthermore, while in the 
dual labour market the low expected duration of a temporary contract implies that the job’s 
productivity is relatively lower and, consequently, the cyclical fl uctuations in the fi ring threshold 
are sizable, in a labour market with a single contract type this cyclical volatility is lower since 
the fi ring threshold varies in a similar way to that for permanent employees in a dual labour 
market. In short, employment in a labour market with a single contract type behaves like the 
permanent component of employment in a dual labour market. This result is valid for a very 
wide range of fi ring costs which includes plausible values for such costs in most countries.
Furthermore, the simulations performed may underestimate the negative effects of duality. The 
existence of mechanisms which either generate unemployment persistence or lead to labour 
stability being favourable for productivity make the employment and unemployment volatility 
generated by duality even more harmful for social welfare.
From the above-mentioned fi ndings it can be concluded that a dual labour market generates 
higher volatility than a labour market with a single contract type. These fi ndings are important 
on several fronts. As for regulatory implications, it can be argued that employment and unem-
ployment volatility is, in itself, negative for social well-being. While the social costs of unem-
ployment increase more quickly, the higher the level of unemployment is, a labour market 
which causes higher volatility is less socially desirable than a labour market which gives rise to 
lower volatility. As for its implications for macroeconomic stabilisation policies, employment 
volatility complicates their implementation and increases their costs. Duality also affects labour 
productivity negatively, even when, as in this analytical framework, temporary employment 
were not to adversely infl uence employees’ accumulation of experience and training.
However, it should be pointed out that the fi ndings of this analysis of different abstract contract 
regimes refer to their long-term properties and that in order to obtain their practical implica-
tions it would be necessary to also take into account the complexities of the transition from 
duality to a new contractual system. In any event, according to this analysis, attempting to 
reduce labour segmentation in the current setting by penalising temporary hires and at the 
same time maintaining the current conditions for permanent hires would notably harm the 
Conclusions
DUAL MARKET
 
SINGLE CONTRACT
FIRING COSTS 2.1 (permanent) 2.1 1.4 1.1 0.4
0.0 (temporary)
1.4 (average)
Costs paid (% of GDP) 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.3
Unemployment rate (average) % 10.1 12.0 12.2 11.9 10.1
Standard deviation of unemployment rate 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8
Standard deviation of job creation 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Standard deviation of job destruction 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
VOLATILITY OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IN ALTERNATIVE FIRING COST ARRANGEMENTS TABLE 1 
SOURCE: Costain, Jimeno and Thomas (2010). 
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outlook for a recovery in employment. Conversely, introducing a new common contract type 
for new hires with a fi ring cost lower than that of a permanent contract currently in force would 
increase job creation and reduce labour market volatility both in the short and long term.
Lastly, it should not be forgotten that the analytical model, the fi ndings of which are summa-
rised in this article, is designed to analyse in detail one specifi c aspect of the labour market but 
not to act as a basis for a suffi ciently comprehensive proposal for reform. For this purpose, it 
would be necessary to analyse other very important aspects which, like wage bargaining ar-
rangements or active employment policies, are beyond the scope of this model.
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